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Article 11

Medical Ethics: A Clinical Base
David C. Thomasma, Ph.D.

The author is a professor of medicine and philosophy and director
of the medical humanities program at Loyola University Stritch
School of Medicine.
A recent mllI-symposium in the Hastings Center Report (April,
1981) was devoted to the topic of philosophers in the clinical setting.
This paper is intended to contribute further to the issues raised in that
symposium, especially those raised by William Ruddick and Mark
Siegler.
Various views exist about the role and scope of medical ethics.
Ingelfinger,l Shelton,2 and MacIntyre 3. 4 argue that medical ethics
is dangerous or useless. Hare,G Morgenbesser,6 and Callahan 7 are
among those who ascribe to a non-clinical view of medical ethics,
namely, that it is a branch of philosophical ethics applied to medicine.
Marquis8 and McKee 9 question the validity of clinical medical ethics,
though for different reasons. Siegler, 10 Siegler and Pellegrino, 11 Pellegrino12 and Jonsen 13 all argue for the appropriateness of a clinically based medical ethics. The last-named all argue for thi~ position for
practical reasons, the most important being the complexity of modern
medicine and the fact that clinicians must be involved in setting policies which would otherwise be left to outsiders.
The cause of such diversity lies, in part, with the newness of the
discipline. Medical ethics has not yet proved itself. Part, too, is occasioned by a different view of the aim of medical ethics. Should it aim
at practical consideration 14 . 15. 16 or should it be an application of
more theoretical ethical labor to medicine? 17, 18 , 19.20 The process
of applying theory to practice represents a more deductive view of
ethics in general, and medical ethics in particular, than the tack taken
by others who prefer to operate inductively from cases to resolutions.
Finally, objections are raised against medical ethics on grounds that it
usurps the decision-making requirements of medical practice without
either sufficient knowledge 21 or proper authority.22. 23
I shall add my voice to those calling for a clinically based medical
ethics by attempting to clarify the confusion which exists about the
role and presence of medical ethics in the heart of medicine. The
problems are either posed in the literature or stem from my experience as a philosopher in the clinical setting. First I will raise three
important objections to the clinical presence of philosopher and
attempt to answer these objections. In the second section, I will out-

266

Linacre Quarterly

line the tasks of a philosopher developed from experience spanning
eight years.
Three Objections
The three objections which have been or can be raised to a clinically based medical ethics and the presence of philosophers on rounds
are that they constitute outside interference in professional judgment,
that ethics can best be taught by role models in medicine who can
infuse moral character in students, and that philosophers sell out their
discipline by participating in clinical decisions. Each objection will be
taken in turn.
1) Outside Interference

•t

"

The first problem medical ethics faces is the accusation that it is a
power grab by philosophers, theologians and lawyers who are meddle·
some at best and counter·productive at worst. A strong sense of
paranoia infuses the view, as medical ethics is frequently listed among
the many other outside interferences which make professional judgment in medicine so difficult today.
Just to cite paranoia is not to answer the objection that philos·
ophers are out of place in the clinical setting, however. In the main, if
resistance occurs for this reason, the objection seems to vanish after
some experience with philosophers in the clinical setting. Physicians,
such as Victor Sidel, note that the comments of outsiders such as
philosophers are tolerated if they help clinicians do their work. In
addition, philosophers can assist in the formulation of policy as
needed by the institution. 24 As the large number of programs relating
ethics to medicine now attests, some easing of the "outsider" objec·
tion has occurred. 25
However, if the objection is formulated in a stronger mode, it is not
so easy to dismiss. Ingelfinger's concerns go to the heart of the matter
and deserve a more careful response. 26 The challenge he poses is how
clinical ethics and all other humanities can actually improve the quality of patient care. After all, medicine is aimed at making good decisions with patients and handling patient management problems. In this
respect, clinical judgment is the guiding force of practice. 27 Given this
pragmatic, patient-oriented approach, how can philosophers at the
bedside be actually said to "assist" in patient care?
Further, the objection is strengthened when one considers the qualities of philosophers. They are normally argumentative, have a penchant for abstract discussion, love to pose theoretical cases to illuminate some obscure point, are loners, and as William Ruddick remarks,
are more interested in truth and autonomy than in patient care. 28
What, then, can the philosopher add to the patient care judgments
of a morally sensitive physician? Granted the above description of
philosophers might be a stereotype, the question still stands.
August, 1982
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In response, it must be said straight off that there is no medical
necessity for philosophers to accompany clinicians on rounds. Their
presence depends on educational and consultative objectives. However, I will argue that their presence can contribute to improved
patient care decisions.
The appropriateness of having philosophers accompany physicians
on rounds stems from the nature of medical ethics as a discipline.
First, the proper aim of medical ethics is to contribute to the resolution of medical dilemmas. 29 Medical ethics labors which do not have
this perspective as a goal are better labeled ethics of medicine and left
to academic discussion. Since most of the dilemmas posed by modern
medicine lie in making moral decisions about patient care or the distribution of care, medical ethics must have a clinical base in order to
understand properly the realities of clinical practice, otherwise medical ethics will be condemned to artificial generalizations and incompetent conclusions. Therefore, while there is no medical necessity for
philosophers to make rounds with clinicians, there is a necessIty for
the growth of medical ethics as a discipline.
The distinction between medical ethics and ethics of medicine is
useful for delineating the role of medical ethics in the clinical setting.
"Ethics of medicine" can be used to describe the more abstract discussion of a range of clinically posed problems as might appear, for
example, in a general examination· of issues in abortion or euthanasia.
Such discussion is complex and would necessarily involve the lengthy
examination of issues which would forestall any urgent or immediate
decisions about patient care. In the clinical setting, such discussion is
out of place because of the clinical imperative, making some decision
about patient care. On the other hand, "medical ethics" can be used
to describe a more analytic, case-oriented approach to a specific moral
issue. Instead of a general discussion of the major issues involved in
euthanasia, then, a specific case is discussed. The patient care objectives are interlaced in the medical ethics discussion, and some action
by the staff is recommended. Instead of an exploration and clarification of principles, the goal of medical ethics as a clinical discipline is
to contribute to a patient care decision in a specific clinical setting
(the intensive care unit, for example).
In this respect, philosophers can contribute the insights and
language stemming from their sophisticated ethics training to clarification of moral issues in difficult medical cases, as well as to the larger
questions of hospital policy. In fact, if Callahan's prediction about the
future of medical ethics debates holds true,30 philosophers familiar
with the realities, goals, and pressures of clinical practice will be allies
of physicians in the forthcoming discussion of social disagreements
about moral principle.
Second,it should also be noted that medical ethics has been developed by physicians as well as humanities professionals. As many physi-
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cians have written about moral questions in medicine as other professionals. Medical ethics is not the special province of moral philosophers. Rather to achieve its aim, it must represent a true partnership
between practicing health professionals and moralists. In order for the
partnership to thrive, however, it must be based upon a real engagement between moral thinkers and physicians regarding issues in the
clinical setting. 3 ! Even more long-range policy discussions require at
least a modicum of medical understanding and, hopefully, an audience
to be effective.
Thirdly, while philosophers can and do call into question some of
the moral aspects of medicine, it is not the role of medical ethicists to
question medical theory, for they have no knowledge or skill in this
area. Nor do they have the patient care responsibility assigned to
physicians by the doctor-patient relationship. But, medical decisions
relate to the broader goal of healing persons in which moral decisions
do take place. 32 Clinical indicators alone do not satisfy the requirements of medical decisions. In fact, clinical indicators are evaluative
and normative. The patient's values, social values, institutional values,
and professional values also enter each decision. These can be questioned by philosophers.
Because medical decisions are moral, i.e., involve moral values, it is
important to clarify and rank these values, indicating which of them are
ethical values. 33 Few physicians have the philosophical training necessary for this task. One could argue further that decisions made in patient
care without attention to the ethical values fail on two counts. First, it
seems unlikely that such decisions can truly be said to help heal the
person who is the patient. 34 Healing must involve the values of the
patient or it will, in some way, denigrate the patient as a person. Cure
of the patient may be possible, but not healing of the person .
Secondly, such decisions, even if judged to be ethical, lack the degree
of reflective articulation on ethics and values in general required not
only of professional judgment but also of communication about decisions with patients. Thus, Ruddick finds that the clinical presence of
philosophers increases the consciousness of clinicians and philosophers
about their professional assumptions and helps them both acquire a
new degree of self-reflection. !l5 This finding is borne out in my own
experience.
If an authentic learning posture between clinicians and moral philosophers is maintained, the role of medical ethics in medical decisions
is clarified. The philosopher learns to reject generalizations and condemnations through greater sympathy with clinical closure demands,
the pressure to make decisions, professional and personal values, institutional values, and other factors which bear upon the decision. None
of those are available in abstract texts, as they vary from case to case,
situation to situation, service to service, institution to institution. In
sum, philosophers derive from clinicians the practical wisdom they so
August, 1982
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often lack.
On the other hand, physicians learn to trust the insights and even
the recommendations of philosophers so experienced. 36 At least two
elements are present in this trust. The first is that the philosopher
truly understands the situation of the clinician and shares the latter's
compassion for the patient. The second element is as important as the
first. The trust is based upon an ability, by no means common among
philosophers, theologians and the like, to communicate philosophical
insights rapidly and clearly. In other words, knowledgeable persons in
their own discipline who are able to translate insights are essential in
the clinical setting. The aim of clinical discussions of ethical issues
must always be targeted to the case at hand and not detract from
patient care obligations with lengthy discourses on philosophical distinctions. It is this requirement which gives rise to the charge to be
addressed in the third objection.
In sum, the presence of philosophers in the clinical setting can be
instructive for both philosophers and clinicians, raising the degree of
professional awareness of principles. The philosopher also gains the
necessary clinical understanding over the years to comment on cases
which represent difficult ethical dilemmas, contribute to hospital
policy, and teach and write on medical ethics issues with respect for
medical realities. In teaching, philosophers can help prepare a generation of medical students in the principles of philosophical ethics and
process of moral reasoning which are necessary for an advanced stage
of reflective clinical performance and moral decision-making, a
correlation which Sheehan et al. have found among residents. 37
Finally, the patient benefits from a greater facility in the health care
team for a clear discussion of the moral values in their case, and from
a greater ability among students and residents to handle the complex
of values in a morally sophisticated way. Needless to say, improved
levels of moral reasoning do not guarantee an ethical decision. But
they do lead to improved clinical performance.
Sheehan's study is one of the first to offer hard evidence that
indicators of clinical performance used to evaluate residents are
directly affected by medical ethics training. There were 18 indicators
based on work by Cook, Margolis, Elstein and Lindenfield.38 These
indicators included: admits mistakes, works well with others, aware of
own limits, compassionate, relates well to patients, medical knowledge, clinical judgment, accepts responsibility, seeks consultations,
empathy, and responds well to emergencies. Sheehan et al. found that
"the very highest level of clinical performance is rarely achieved by
those who remain at a low level of moral thought" (p. 401). Of
course, no claim can be made that the medical ethics training makes
physicians more ethical.
In the clinical context, the philosopher is accountable to the managing physician. Perhaps the best way to formalize this accountability
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and the duties of philosophers as part of a health care team is to
establish an ethics advisory service. The partnership between philosopher and clinician is institutionally recognized. The University of
Tennessee advisory service is officially approved by St. Jude Hospital,
the Veterans' Administration Hospital, four units of the City of
Memphis Hospital, and the University Hospital. The advisory service
functions like a consultation. There are three functions. First, we offer
advice to the managing physician regarding difficult cases. In the past
few months we have been asked for advice, in some cases in the chart,
regarding the termination of treatment for a child with cancer, a dispute among physicians regarding the use of a respirator, and the
extent of care for an aged alcoholic. In some services, residents flag
cases which may present ethical difficulties. Second, we help develop
hospital policy regarding such things as research on children. Third, we
assist physicians in their obligation to teach medical students the
requirement of moral judgment as it occurs inherently in medical
judgment, by accompanying them on rounds in six specialties.
Ingelfinger's objection is answered, therefore, as follows. Improved
patient care can be the result of clinical medical ethics if one takes
patient care to be broader than cure of organic disease. Medicine
involves ethics in its decisions for patients. Improved reflection on
ethics, facility with language, and moral reasoning can be expected
from inviting philosophers to be clinically based educators and consultants. These improvements have a direct impact on the quality of
patient care.
2) Character

/

The second major objection to a clinical medical ethics stems from
a notion that students imbibe moral character necessary for ethical
judgments from great teachers. McKee 39 has raised this objection to
the need for teaching ethics at the bedside originally presented by
Pellegrin0 40 and Siegler.41
There is little doubt that great teachers have a profound effect on
students, as the latter note in their response to McKee. 42 However, it
should be noted that the major teachers of medical students in medical centers are the residents and interns, from whom students learn to
manage their time, categorize patients, and make medical decisions.
Only rarely do students encounter the kind of great teachers McKee
envisions.
In addition, students most frequently do their clerkships in a hospital environment in which clinical indicators are emphasized to the
detriment of other values of the patient. Carlton's sociological study
demonstrated that unless ethics is clinically reinforced, earlier courses
in the curriculum will have no effect against the "professionalization
of judgment."43 If, as I have argued, ethics is an inherent feature of
August, 1982
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medical decision-making, then clinical reinforcement of this aspect of
medicine is essentia1. 44
To be sure, great teachers can and do employ this reinforcement.
My experience reveals, however, that a majority of medical educators
retains an interest in medical ethics, but either do not feel comfortable
enough with the language to teach it explicitly, or do not have time to
keep current with the literature in the field. Then, too, some specialists seem totally unaware of the moral dimensions of the cases they
attend, just as they seem unaware of the economic dimensions of their
decisions. Students often raise questions which they have trouble
fielding. Most attending physicians seem to welcome the medical
ethics faculty on rounds because of their familiarity with clinical realities and with the medical ethics literature, albeit under the conditions
of consultation already discussed.
These comments do not address McKee's major contention, however. He seems not only to hold that ethics is learned by example and
not didactics, but also questions whether one can teach ethics at all. In
this regard he has confused moral character with the teaching of
ethics. Moral character and professional integrity are taught. Each year
medical schools certify the latter and hopefully attest to the former.
Example is a powerful means of encouraging such moral character.
However, didactic teaching of the humane sciences is also a means, as
recent studies on the use of Kohlberg's stages of moral development in
the classroom show. 45
Clearly, McKee interprets ethics to mean moral character. They are
not synonymous. Ethics is a discipline in its own right, a discipline of
reasoning about ethical principles and moral practices. Medical ethics
should be considered both a branch of ethics and a branch of medicine. In the former guise, it is a branch of applied ethics in which the
theories and axioms of ethics are applied to medical dilemmas. In the
latter guise, medical ethics is a critical reflection on the moral norms
arising from the practice of medicine and a study of their reconciliation with patient and society's values. 46 In both respects medical
ethics can be taught.
3) Sell-Out
The final major objection against a clinically based medical ethics
comes from moral thinkers. It is levelled against those who "sell-out"
their discipline by making recommendations and watering down philosophical discussions. We have also been accused of siding too much
with physicians we have come to respect.
Clearly, philosophers in a clinical setting must maintain an objectivity required by their own discipline. Otherwise what they offer
would be easily obtained from a coterie of admirers. But the objection
that philosophers "sell out" their discipline by becoming practical and
resolution-oriented is wholly without merit.
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The greatest moral thinkers - Aristotle, Kant, Mill, Dewey - occupied their time by addressing real moral issues. They did not play
crossword puzzles with words and distinctions. By ensuring that medical ethics keeps its feet, waist, chest and head in the realities of the
clinical setting, the partnership between medicine and ethics has a
decent chance to establish an equivalent greatness.
Roles of Clinical Philosophers

t i

'/

I

Possible functions for clinical philosophers in medical ethics were
suggested in the previous section. However, the functions were offered
from the perspective of consultation and education objectives. In this
section I will briefly describe activities in which philosophers in the
clinical setting engage. These are taken from my own experience and
that of fellow faculty so occupied. I have identified at least eight
activities.
1) Listening: Presence in the clinical setting allows us to listen to
clinicians express their ethical concerns about a case as they develop.
There is usually a cathartic moment after which initial reservations of
the clinician are overcome, and after which he or she begins to develop
a professional bond with the philosopher, encouraging the latter to
consider a number of further problems for joint exploration . Many
clinicians have explicitly stated that they prefer this bond to consults
with chaplains or the social scientists. But this may only be a matter
of taste and intellectual stimulation.
2) Analyzing Intuitions: I find that intuitions about the right course
of action in a case are often expressed. These are analyzed and critically examined, usually after the catharsis mentioned in 1). The
result of such analysis is greater awareness of the role of feelings,
character, and professional style on the part of the physician as these
roles enter clinical judgment. These are further separated from the
ethical judgment in the case so that they may not be misconstrued for
moral rules.
3) Reconciling Accounts of Case: Incredibly, I find that the clinical
philosopher, as an arm of the managing physician, often has a clearer
picture of a difficult case than many of the players in it, the patient,
the house staff, the nurses, and so on. Much of our time is spent
pursuing leads, analyzing intuitions, and tracing third party statements
("The student said that the nurse said that the patient was uncooperative .. . "). This function occurs because we are usually called for consultation on a difficult case which, at the very least, involves clashes in
values and corresponding complex emotional content.
N one of the first three functions are specifically those of an
ethicist. Anyone called in on a case would encounter them . The rest
are specific to ethicists.
4) Sketch Ethical Landscape: After the first three activities are
August, 1982
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accomplished to some extent, the clinical philosopher begins to sketch
the ethical landscape. It is not appropriate at this point to insist on
one or another ethical theory. This function can best be understood as
an initial description of the ethical parameters of a case. Without
sufficient clinical experiences, philosophers often neglect the medical
and institutional data important for this sketch.
5) Isolation of the Mujor Ethical Issues: This function establishes
the ethical import of a case. It usually occurs when those involved are
able to state that the case is one of consent, or autonomy, or the
doctor's duty, or some other classification which aids in the discussion
by eliminating extraneous issues. Often, at this stage, the clinical philosopher will distinguish the ethical issues from those which are legal or
economic.
6) Identifying and Ranking Values: Assisting those involved in the
case usually involves a struggle to wrestle with all the conflicting
values. Here the philosopher can greatly aid the professionals who often
lack the skills to sort out and rank these values. "Which should come
first: the patient request or my duty?" "The state law says that I have
to have cessation of total brain function, but it seems inhumane to
keep him alive when others need his bed." In these two sentences are
contained important professional, personal, legal, and ethical duties.
How are they to be ranked? If the decision is made without some
explicit ranking of the values, I call it a knee-jerk decision, most often
colored by emotions or the last person with whom one talked. Ranking requires ethical dialogue. It also requires the next step.
7) Provide Some Theory of Ranking: Reasons are given in the sixth
function for ranking certain values above others, and so reaching a
decision. These reasons are actually statements of ethical principle
which for personal and professional reasons should bear some consistent stamp over the course of the years. The theory of ranking a
philosopher can contribute, then, directly bears on decisions to be
made by the managing physician. I find that if all the other functions
have been properly carried out, this theory of moral weight to be
given to conflicting values most often reflects a joint decision in the
case, or at least reflects an ethically justifiable claim by the physician
for his or her decision.
Experience with this function can then lead the philosopher as
educator to develop a process of moral reasoning to be taught the
medical students, so that the process of ranking values and giving
reasons for this ranking can be the basis of an educational program. We
call ours an "Ethical Workup." 47 Focus on the process has the merit
of providing the structure of moral reasoning without a requirement
to justify one's decisions using any particular moral theory.
8) Making Policy Recommendations: Certain problems occur frequently enough to warrant the development of hospital or institutional policy. Resuscitation guidelines are just one example. These
274
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policies do not eliminate the moral reasoning process just described
for each individual case.48 But they do attempt to develop general
guidelines, like those protecting human subjects in research, which
help clinicians map the moral territory of a case more quickly, because
some of the reasons in 6) and the theory in 7) have been discussed
ahead of time. It is, after all, the mark of educated persons to anticipate their future moral quandaries from their past experience. I find
that this function is most often fulfilled in joint research undertaken
by the philosopher with clinicians, perhaps because the philosopher is
disposed to the realm of generalization rather than particulars.
These functions are not meant to be exhaustive. In fact they do not
include interest philosophers have gained from medical practice in
developing a philosophy of medicine. But they do show, I think, how
inviting philosophers to function clinically can ultimately benefit the
level and structure of moral decisions in medicine, and therefore, how
clinical medical ethics can improve the quality of health care.
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